FOCUS · State-security archives
State-security archives: access, evidence and accountability
Two-stage disclosure, access rights, documentary interpretation and parliamentary scrutiny.
Two stages of disclosure
Act LI of 2026 establishes the new access regime, with its substantive provisions effective from 4 November. The statutory data from registration cards, B-registers and the H magnetic-tape database form the first stage. Recruitment dossiers are to be disclosed progressively from 4 November and no later than 25 February 2027.
Those deadlines concern records held by the archive on 31 July 2026. Later acquisitions are subject to subsequent ongoing disclosure. Commencement does not mean every surviving state-security record was published online on 4 November.
What a record establishes
The statutory definitions expressly include failed recruitment attempts in both registration cards and recruitment dossiers. A name appearing in a record does not by itself establish actual collaboration. Status and the purpose for which an item of information was recorded must be assessed separately.
Identity, document type, provenance and evidence of actual conduct matter together. A person under surveillance mentioned in another person’s dossier does not thereby become an informant. Attempted recruitment, registration and proven reporting are different claims.
Public search, personal access and research
Online publication, access based on personal involvement and academic research follow different rules. A document absent from the public search interface may be available through another access procedure. Access and subsequent publication rights are not invariably identical.
Individuals need to establish what was collected about them, who was involved and what copies they can obtain. Researchers need context and comparison between sources. Public reporting also requires precise claims and respect for the people concerned.
Why redactions remain
The Act protects specified information even within published document types. Health, addiction and sexual-life data, and information concerning surveillance subjects and third parties, receive distinct treatment from identification of collaborators. Disclosure does not abolish privacy safeguards.
An affected person may add a supplementary statement to records concerning them. The historical document remains while the person’s account can be recorded alongside it. Original evidence, interpretation and the affected person’s response should remain distinguishable.
Parliamentary scrutiny in November
The National Security Committee’s published agenda for 9 November included concerns and contradictions relating to the records published on 4 November. An agenda title does not establish a committee finding of error or responsibility.
In question K/1085, Zsuzsa Máthé and Csaba Latorcai ask Prime Minister Péter Magyar about political responsibility and allege that more than 160 surveillance subjects were wrongly labelled agents. The question contains no independently verifiable list or supporting evidence and is not the Prime Minister’s answer. Investigation and the response are the next substantive elements.
Conditions for fuller historical disclosure
Searchable publication is only one part of access. Classification review, transfer of further material and research access also matter. The Act’s institutional safeguards do not automatically release protected information. Absence from a public search result is not proof that a relationship did not exist.
The archive highlights the historical limitations of the H database and the need to compare incomplete surviving sources. Social value therefore cannot be measured by the count of published names alone. Retrievability, corrections of misinterpretation and handling of individual requests also matter.
What to follow until February 2027
Key milestones are publication of recruitment dossiers by the statutory deadline, clarification of disputed classifications and answers to parliamentary questions. Newly disclosed records may change the context and certainty of earlier claims.
Institutional reporting, actual disclosure and the handling of personal requests together provide a basis for scrutiny. For individuals, the practical result is access to the documentary record of their own history and an opportunity to respond to disputed assertions.