WEEKLY FOCUS · Enforcement inquiry
Hungary’s enforcement inquiry: from testimony to evidence
The inquiry has moved from institutional data requests to expert evidence and accounts from inside the enforcement system. Its value will depend on whether these strands produce documented findings and a workable reform proposal.
The inquiry now has several strands to connect
The committee’s work has advanced in two directions: examining the institutional rules behind enforcement and hearing people who describe alleged abuses. These strands belong together. Individual accounts can reveal where oversight failed; institutional records are needed to test how widespread a problem was.
Parliament established the committee on 26 May. Its mandate covers systemic failures and proposals for a state-run, nonprofit enforcement model. It does not empower the committee to determine individual criminal liability. The reporting deadline remains 31 December 2026.
- Requests to the regulator, the notaries’ chamber and the bailiffs’ body set out the institutional evidence sought.
- Péter Hack, Máté Szabó and Zsuzsanna Fiszter addressed incentives, oversight and debtor protection.
- Former chief prosecutor Pál Fürcht gave evidence about the investigation of enforcement abuses.
- Former bailiff Ferenc Kiss described alleged failings in the profession’s operations.
Appointments, fees and oversight form one system
The September requests to the Supervisory Authority for Regulated Activities (SZTFH), the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries (MOKK) and the Hungarian Chamber of Judicial Officers (MBVK) covered appointments, scoring, supervision, complaints, enforcement clauses and auction data. The deadline was 28 September. Issuing these requests does not establish that complete responses arrived.
The 16 September minutes record the first personal expert hearings. Hack and Szabó criticised the incentives and external controls of the system; Fiszter proposed a nonprofit model. These were the witnesses’ assessments. The committee still has to turn the evidence into its own findings.
The 23 September hearing of Terézia Péczely and Balázs Braun brought payroll deductions, debtor information, remedies and costs into the discussion. This matters because an effective reform has to work through employers, case administration and complaints procedures as well as through a new institutional structure.
The October hearings sharpen the questions for the inquiry
At his 21 October parliamentary hearing, Fürcht said Szilvia Tomin had relayed a message that the preliminary proceedings concerning Pál Völner should be closed; he said they both opposed this. He also said the investigators had concluded that Judit Varga did not know of the abuses. These are Fürcht’s accounts, not findings adopted by the committee.
At the 28 October hearing, Kiss alleged failures involving information systems, fee accounting and appointments. He handed over a 247-page document. György Balla challenged the credibility of his account, while other members also pressed for specifics. The handover establishes that material was supplied, not that its claims have been substantiated.
The analytical task is to identify the record supporting each account: an instruction, correspondence, an audit, an accounting entry or a contemporaneous decision. The responses of the institutions and people concerned are equally important. An allegation cannot become a quantified loss or a finding of misconduct merely because it was made at a parliamentary hearing.
The recorded votes concern procedure and invitations
| Decision | Recorded result | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Adoption of the agenda | Unanimous · page 5 | Authorised the business of that meeting. |
| Inviting Péczely, Braun and Roland Asztalos | Unanimous, with no votes against or abstentions · page 39 | An invitation decision; it does not establish subsequent attendance. |
The minutes do not state a numerical total of votes in favour. They therefore support “unanimous”, without a reconstructed six-to-zero tally. Neither decision adopted a new enforcement model.
The 15 October meeting decided on later testimony or written statements from former justice ministers and other participants. These decisions widen the inquiry’s scope; they do not mean that all the planned hearings had taken place by 29 October.
A nonprofit model still needs an operating and financial plan
On pages 29–30 of the September minutes, Fiszter outlined salaried public employees, published recruitment procedures, central accounts and case allocation, with a possible role for the courts or the tax authority. She expected the system to cover its costs, but did not present a quantified financial plan. Her proposal is a contribution to the inquiry, not an adopted reform.
A credible comparison must put fee revenue alongside staffing, offices, information systems, supervision and the cost of transferring existing cases. Reducing charges on debtors, preserving reliable recovery for creditors and paying for the new organisation are connected choices. Moving revenue into a public body does not by itself create a budget saving.
The next substantive milestone is a report that connects particular evidence to identified weaknesses, proposed changes and responsibility for implementation. It should also explain how current cases would continue during a transition. These are the questions against which the committee’s eventual recommendations can be assessed.
By 29 October the inquiry had assembled important lines of questioning and heard contrasting accounts. Its lasting contribution will depend on the quality of the evidence connecting those accounts to institutional change, and on a financial plan that can support the proposed model.